The Person in Situation Debate

Abstract:
Using a hypothetical situation describing a stimulus person who succeeds or fails to win a desired promotion through merit or influence, we tested the hypotheses that greater ethical sensitivity in their evaluation of the stimulus person would be displayed by low compared with high Machiavellians and by female compared with male subjects. The experiment employed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Subject’s Machiavellianism x Subject’s Sex x Stimulus Person’s Merit vs. Influence x Stimulus Person’s Success vs. Failure) factorial design, with 10 subjects per cell. The dependent measures were ratings of the stimulus person on intelligence, morality, and likeability. The stimulus person with merit was rated more favorably on all three dimensions than the person with influence. Female subjects showed a greater ethical sensitivity in their evaluations compared with male subjects. The expectation that low would show greater ethical sensitivity than high Machiavellians was supported only in the case of female subjects; a somewhat opposite finding was obtained in the case of male subjects. 
Machiavellianism has been conceptualized as a personality disposition (Christie & Geis, 1970) particularly relevant for the understanding of those social behaviors involving deception, manipulation, and exploitation of others for the furtherance of one’s own interests (Brown & Guy, 1983; Jones & Wortman, 1973). Machiavellianism and ingratiation appear to be staple components of interpersonal relations in Indian society (Pandey & Rastogi, 1979; Pandey & Singh, 1986). It is an extremely common situation in India that a person with influence is preferred to a person with merit for a desirable position. We explored reactions to such a situation as a function of subject’s Machiavellianism. 
Although subject’s Machiavellianism (high vs. low) was the independent variable of primary concern in the present study, we were also interested in the effects of three other independent variables, as well as in their potential interactions with Machiavellianism: subject’s sex, stimulus person’s merit versus influence, and stimulus person’s success versus failure in acquiring a desired job. The dependent measures were the ratings of the stimulus person on intelligence, morality, and likeability. 
We expected low Machiavellians (Machs) to rate the stimulus person with merit more favorably than the person with influence and high Machs to be less sensitive in their discrimination between merit and influence. Because success is very important to high Machs by whatever means, it was predicted that the successful compared with the unsuccessful stimulus person would be evaluated more favorably by high Machs irrespective of the means employed to achieve success, whereas the evaluations by low Machs would depend on the means of achieving success. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that there would be a main effect for merit, with more positive ratings given to the person with merit rather than influence; this tendency was expected to be more prominent for low than high Machs, giving rise to a two-way interaction between subject’s Machiavellianism and stimulus person’s merit. This two-way interaction was expected to be stronger in the case of success than of failure, giving rise to a three-way interaction among subject’s Machiavellianism, stimulus person’s merit, and stimulus person’s outcome. 
In light of previous findings (Kanekar & Pinto, 1985; Pereira & Kanekar, 1984), another hypothesis of our study was that female subjects would show greater sensitivity to ethical principles than male subjects. In India, there is a strong cultural stereotype about the altruistic and nurturant nature of women, apparently stronger than a similar stereotype in Western countries. Therefore, we expected the differences in ratings between merit and influence to be larger for female than for male subjects, giving rise to a two-way interaction between subject’s sex and stimulus person’s merit and possibly a three-way interaction among these two and stimulus person’s outcome, similar to the predicted interactions involving subject’s Machiavellianism. 
All hypotheses were expected to be more clearly supported by the measures of morality and likability than by the measure of intelligence, because the experiment primarily involved a moral issue and likability was expected to be mediated more by judgments on morality than by judgments on intelligence. 
Method 
A total of 218 graduate students (90 male, 128 female) at the University of Bombay were administered the Mach V Attitude Inventory, which attempts to “measure a person’s general strategy for dealing with people” (Robinson & Shaver, 1973, p. 590). Scores on this scale range from 20 to 140, with higher scores representing higher Machiavellianism. The mean Mach score for the male subjects was 80.97, SD = 10.07. The mean Mach score for female subjects was 81.85, SD = 9.89. Because the means for men and women were not significantly different, t(216) = 0.63, they were categorized into low- and high-Mach groups on the basis of a common median of 81, the range of scores being 54 to 110. Those scoring about 81 were designated high Machs; low Machs were those who scored below 81. 
The subjects of the experiment proper, which began about 2 weeks after the administration of the Mach scale, were 160 graduate students (80 male, 80 female) selected from the original pool of 218 students on the basis of their Mach scores. Their ages ranged from 20 to 26 years. The experiment employed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Subject’s Machiavellianism x Subject’s Sex x Stimulus Person’s Merit vs. Influence x Stimulus Person’s Success vs. Failure) factorial design, with 10 subjects per cell. The last two independent variables were manipulated by appropriate variations in a scenario about a stimulus person who was one of two candidates for promotion to a superior position in their company. 
The subjects were given sex-appropriate scenarios, that is, the two candidates in the scenarios were men for male subjects and women for female subjects. For example, the following passage was used for the experimental condition of the male stimulus person who has merit and is successful in acquiring the desired job: 
Ashok and Deepak are two junior executives in a multi-national firm. A senior executive in the company has retired, hence there is a vacancy for this post. Ashok and Deepak have both applied for this position in the firm. Ashok is a hard-working and able individual and has a good record in the company. Deepak’s father is related to one of the directors of the firm. After the interview, Ashok is declared successful and secures the position of senior executive in the firm. 
The other experimental conditions, namely, that of a stimulus person who has merit and is unsuccessful, that of a stimulus person who has influence and is successful, and that of a stimulus person who has influence and is unsuccessful, were created by the appropriate substitution of words in the above scenario, with feminine replacing masculine names for female subjects. 
After reading the relevant passage, subjects rated the stimulus person on three 7-point rating scales representing intelligence, morality, and likeability, with higher numerical ratings reflecting more positive evaluations. 
Results 
Product-moment correlations among the three dependent measures across all conditions (df = 158, in all cases) were .37 (p < .001) between intelligence and morality, .25 (p < .01) between intelligence and likeability, and .64 (p < .001) between morality and likeability. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed separately for each of the three measures. 
Intelligence 
The main effect of stimulus person’s merit on intelligence was significant, F(1,144) = 11.90, p < .001, with the person with merit being rated higher than the person with influence (M = 4.81 vs. 4.26). 
The two-way interaction between subject’s Machiavellianism and subject’s sex was significant, F(1,144) = 5.53, p < .025. High-Mach women rated the stimulus person higher on intelligence than did low-Mach women (M = 4.95 vs. 4.30), F(1,144) = 8.31, p < .005. There was no such difference for men. 
The two-way interaction between subject’s sex and stimulus person’s merit was significant, F(1,144) = 4.82, p < .05. Women rated the stimulus person with merit higher on intelligence than the one with influence (M = 5.08 vs. 4.18), F(1,144) = 15.93, p < .001. There was no significant difference between merit and influence for men. 
The three-way interaction among subject’s Machiavellianism, stimulus person’s merit, and stimulus person’s outcome was significant, F(1,144) = 5.53, p < .025. High Machs rated the unsuccessful stimulus person higher on intelligence when the person had merit rather than influence (M = 4.80 vs. 4.15), F(1,144) = 4.16, p < .05, whereas low Machs rated the successful stimulus person higher when the person had merit rather than influence (M = 5.00 vs. 3.80), F(1,144) = 14.16, p < .001. No other differences between merit and influence were significant for this interaction. 
Morality 
The main effect of stimulus person’s merit on morality was significant, F(1,144) = 44.48, p < .001, with the person with merit being rated higher than the person with influence (M = 5.13 vs. 3.78). The main effect of stimulus person’s outcome was also significant, F(1,144) = 4.94, p < .05, with the unsuccessful person being rated higher than the successful person (M = 4.68 vs. 4.23). 
The two-way interaction between subject’s Machiavellianism and subject’s sex was significant, F(1,144) = 6.10, p < .025, as was the two-way interaction between subject’s sex and stimulus person’s merit, F(1,144) =11.12, p < .005. Both two-way interactions were included in the significant three-way interaction among subject’s Machiavellianism, subject’s sex, and stimulus person’s merit, F(1,144) = 15.62, p < .001; therefore only the higher order interaction is discussed here in terms of post-hoc tests. High-Mach men rated the person with merit higher on morality than the person with influence (M = 4.90 vs. 3.20), F(1,144) = 17.63, p < .001. Similarly, high-Mach women gave higher ratings to the person with merit than to the person with influence (M = 5.45 vs. 4.00), F(1,144) = 12.83, p < .001. The person with merit was rated higher than the person with influence by low-Mach females (M = 5.65 vs. 3.05), F(1,144) = 41.25, p < .001. There was no such difference for low-Mach men. 
The three-way interaction among subject’s Machiavellianism, stimulus person’s merit, and stimulus person’s outcome was significant, F(1,144) = 4.41, p < .05. High Machs rated the successful person higher on morality in the case of merit than of influence (M = 4.95 vs. 3.50), F(1,144) = 12.83, p < .001; they also rated the unsuccessful person higher in the case of merit than of influence (M = 5.40 vs. 3.70), F(1,144) = 17.63, p < .001. Low Machs rated the successful person higher in the case of merit than of influence (M = 5.15 vs. 3.30), F(1,144) = 20.88, p < .001, but there was no significant difference in the low Machs’ ratings of an unsuccessful person with merit versus one with influence. The unsuccessful person with influence was rated higher by low Machs than the successful person with influence (M = 4.60 vs. 3.30), F(1,144) = 10.31, p < .005. No other differences between success and failure were significant for this interaction. 
Likeability 
The main effect of stimulus person’s merit on likeability was significant, F(1,144) = 22.05, p < .001, with the person with merit receiving a higher rating than the person with influence (M = 4.80 vs. 3.98). The main effect of stimulus person’s outcome was also significant, F(1,144) = 6.56, p < .025, with the unsuccessful person receiving a higher rating than the successful person (M = 4.61 vs. 4.16). 
The three-way interaction among subject’s Machiavellianism, subject’s sex, and stimulus person’s merit was significant, F(1,144) = 6.56, p > .025. The person with merit received a higher rating on likeability than the person with influence from high-Mach men (M = 4.90 vs. 3.70), F(1,144) = 11.66, p < .001, from high-Mach women (M = 4.75 vs. 4.00), F(1,144) = 4.56, p < .05, and from low-Mach women (M = 5.25 vs. 3.90), F(1,144) = 14.76, p < .001, but not from low-Mach men. 
The three-way interaction among subject’s Machiavellianism, stimulus person’s merit, and stimulus person’s outcome was significant, F(1,144) = 5.85, p < .025, and included a significant two-way interaction between stimulus person’s merit and outcome, F(1,144) = 6.56, p < .025. The successful person with merit was rated higher on likeability than the successful person with influence by high Machs (M = 4.60 vs. 3.60), F(1,144) = 8.10, p < .01, and also by low Machs (M = 5.00 vs. 3.45), F(1,144) = 19.46, p < .001. The unsuccessful person with influence was rated lower than the unsuccessful person with merit by high Machs (M = 4.10 vs. 5.05), F(1,144) = 7.31, p < .01, and higher than the successful person with influence by low Machs (M = 4.75 vs. 3.45), F(1,144) = 13.69, p < .001. 
Discussion 
The correlations among ratings showed a closer relationship between attributed morality and likeability than between those characteristics and attributed intelligence. This finding suggests that judgments of likeability were more influenced or more likely to be mediated by judgments of morality than of intelligence. 
A broad view of the ANOVA results reveals that the most crucial factor in effects on the dependent measures was the merit of the stimulus person. Its main effects on all the dependent measures were significant, and it featured prominently in almost every significant interaction. Considering only the main effects, we found that the stimulus person with merit was judged more positively than the person with influence on intelligence, morality, and likeability. The only other factor that produced any main effects was stimulus person’s outcome, with the unsuccessful person being rated higher than the successful person on morality and likeability. 
Subject’s Machiavellianism and subject’s sex did not have any main effects, but the two interacted on intelligence and morality. High-Mach women rated the stimulus person higher on intelligence than did low-Mach women. The subjects and the protagonists in the hypothetical situation were of the same sex, so that women were rating a female stimulus person. Female executives are rather rare in India. The female stimulus person was rated quite high on intelligence by the high-Mach but not by the low-Mach women, probably because the high-Mach women were more sensitive to and more impressed by the achievement of the female executive. 
With respect to morality, low-Mach women rated merit higher than influence compared with high-Mach women, as was expected. But contrary to our hypothesis, high-Mach men rated merit higher than influence compared with low-Mach men. We find it difficult to explain the morality ratings of high-Mach men. They may reflect Shakespeare’s words in Hamlet, “The lady protests too much, methinks,’ referring to Gertrude’s naive reaction to the Player Queen, which lays bare her own standards of conduct. There may be an element of projection here or perhaps a holier-than-thou attitude. It is also possible that the high-Mach men were concerned with self-presentation and were using an impression management strategy in their responses to the morality item. 
The above interpretation can be extended to the three-way interaction on likeability among subject’s Machiavellianism, subject’s sex, and stimulus person’s merit. Although low-Mach men’s ratings of likeability of the stimulus person with merit and the person with influence were not different, the person with merit was judged more favorably than the person with influence by high-Mach men, high-Mach women, and low-Mach women. The difference between merit and influence was greater for low-Mach than for high-Mach women; obviously there was a reversal for men. Whereas the rating of high-Mach men can be attributed to impression management, the total lack of difference on likeability between merit and influence manifested by low-Mach men is difficult to understand. The low-Mach men appear to be somewhat naive or insensitive to moral nuances, which were not at all expected. The impression management strategy we speculatively attribute to high-Mach men is not implausible, but it is not clear why this holds only for men and not for women. 
Subject’s sex and stimulus person’s merit interacted with respect to intelligence and morality. On both measures, female subjects showed a greater difference than male subjects in favor of merit compared with influence. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis of the higher ethical sensitivity of women compared with men. The three-way interactions with respect to morality and likeability among subject’s Machiavellianism, subject’s sex, and stimulus person’s merit, discussed above, are also roughly consistent with our expectation of greater ethical sensitivity from women. 
The three-way interaction among subject’s Machiavellianism, stimulus person’s merit, and stimulus person’s outcome was the only interaction that was obtained on all three measures. On all three, only low Machs rated the unsuccessful person with influence significantly higher than the successful person with influence. Apparently, in the case of low Machs, failure tended to mitigate the negative aspect of the person with influence. Thus Kanekar and Pinto’s (1985) finding that an unsuccessful criminal was perceived to be more moral than a successful criminal may hold primarily for people low on Machiavellianism, which was not a variable of interest in that study. The present results suggest that high Machs and low Machs do not see success and failure in the same light, with low Machs tending to be somewhat more naive and less pragmatic than high Machs in their perceptions. 
In summary, women showed a greater ethical sensitivity than men. The expectation that low Machs would show greater ethical sensitivity than high Machs was supported only in the case of female subjects, whereas a somewhat opposite finding was obtained for male subjects. Low Machs appeared to be somewhat more naive and undiscriminating than high Machs, and this was probably more true of male than female subjects. The results suggest that although women and men did not differ significantly on , this fact may not ensure similar attitudes or behavioral tendencies in relevant situations. Scoring high or low on psychometrically assessed Machiavellian-ism may not have precisely the same behavioral implications for male and female subjects, especially in India (cf. Brown & Guy, 1983; Johnson, 1976). 
REFERENCES 
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Pereira, L. B., & Kanekar, S. (1984). Perception of initiatory and retaliatory cheating behaviour. Indian Psychologist, 3, 17-20. 
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Received February 2, 1990